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1. Introduction 
The equity premium, typically defined as the difference between the S&P500 return and a 
risk-free return, is a critical input in portfolio allocation decisions as well as in capital 
budgeting decisions. It is also at the heart of the ongoing policy debate about whether a 
portion of the social security trust fund should be invested in the equity market or not. 
Consequently, it is crucial for finance professionals to be able to accurately gauge the 
size of the premium and to understand the factors that may change its value. 
In their seminal paper, Prescott and Mehra (1985) show that the standard economic 
growth model is unable to explain the historical difference between the average stock re-
turn on a broad index versus risk-free bonds in the United States. This has become known 
as the equity premium puzzle. Although the fact that equity returns are higher than short-
term bond yields makes intuitive sense, the puzzle is that standard risk measures cannot 
explain the size of the historical difference in returns. Many attempts at modifying the 
standard model fall short of fully explaining the size of the premium (Campbell, 2003; 
Kercholakota, 1996; Mehra, 2003). Although a few successful models have been pro-
posed, the current asset pricing literature does not agree on a solution to the equity pre-
mium puzzle as well as other asset pricing anomalies.
1 
Empirical approaches to the study of the equity premium, although not articulating a 
full explanation of the puzzle, do offer alternative pathways in the quest for a solution to 
                                                 
1 In two recent articles, McGrattan and Prescott (2000, 2001) claim to finally put the puzzle to rest. In their 
2000 article, they show that the high ratio of market value of equity to gross national product (GNP) at the 
beginning of the year 2000 is rationally based when computing the value of corporate tangible and intangi-
ble capital assets. In the subsequent 2001 article, they show that during the postwar period, the large rise in 
equity values is as predicted by the theory, once the historical change in the taxation of dividends and the 
increase in holdings in tax-deferred accounts are accounted for. However, McGrattan and Prescott (2001) 
focuses on explaining recent equity returns and does not explain the historical difference between stock and 
risk-free returns.  
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this important puzzle. Asness (2000) draws a link between the size of the expected pre-
mium and differences in the volatility of stocks versus bonds for horizon periods of 20 
years. However, his analysis does not account for the size of the average premium over 
the full historical record.
2  Ibbotson and Chen (2003) use a building-block approach to 
estimate the long-term stock market return, and relate some of the market returns compo-
nents to gross domestic product (GDP) growth. However, they do not establish a firm 
theoretical basis for relating the equity premium directly either to GDP growth or to risk. 
In this article, we show theoretically and empirically that in the long-run, the equity 
premium is directly related to GDP growth and is consistent with downside risk avoid-
ance. Thus, we establish that the historical average value of the equity premium is fully 
accounted for by risk and growth-based explanations. These results in turn enable us to 
accurately gauge the size of the historical premium and to predict changes in the premium 
given extrapolated recent trends.
3 
First, we use a supply-side growth model and develop the macroeconomic equivalent 
of the standard sustainable growth formula found in corporate finance textbooks to de-
termine the long-run average return on stocks. The average stock return depends on GDP 
per capita growth and the earnings retention ratio as well as a premium reflecting system-
atic risk, which is linked to de-trended earnings
4 and market-to-book volatilities and the 
response of dividend and share repurchase policies to these factors. 
                                                 
2 Asness (2000) uses the dividend and earnings yield as proxies for expected returns. Although the ap-
proximations may well be valid, there is evidence that bonds may be more risky than stocks for horizons of 
20 years or longer when looking at ex-post return volatility, as shown by Siegel (2002). 
3 It is important to emphasize that we do not claim to resolve the equity premium puzzle here, because the 
puzzle is really about the failure of the standard asset pricing model. However, it is also a fact that no other 
class of models has been so far put forth to show the consistency of macroeconomic growth rates, risk, and 
other behavioral variables with the size of the premium, which is what we attempt to do here. 
4 Earnings are scaled (or de-trended) by book value of equity. In other words, we examine ROE volatility.  
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We then establish a relationship between GDP growth and the required returns on cor-
porate assets and debt. Based on an empirical analysis at the aggregate corporate level, 
we obtain a value for the return on debt identical to the historical average of the 3-month 
T-bill over the period 1926–2001. Although this result is surprising, it is to some extent, 
an artifact of Flow of Funds data that exhibits a survivor bias, in the sense that it excludes 
defaulted or bankrupt companies over time. This result implies that in the long-run, sur-
vivor-biased corporate debt will be risk-free as the economy grows at a constant rate, 
where the risk-free rate is determined by the 3-month T-Bill, absent any term structure 
effects. 
Our first key conclusion is that, in the long-run, the size of the premium (as expressed 
by the difference between the average stock return and the 3-month T-bill) is a function 
of GDP growth and other financial parameters such as marginal income tax rates. We 
empirically match the historical value of the S&P500 arithmetic average over 1926–2001, 
and the historical equity premium value of 8.1%. 
Our second key result is that the equity premium is also consistent with a compensa-
tion for risk, when viewed in the context of a short-term portfolio insurance motive. We 
use an option-based approach and show that the equity premium is closely approximated 
by a put option premium on a $1 real investment in the market index when a long-term 
investor wishes to insure against year-to-year market volatility, by using the average 
yearly S&P500 volatility over 1926–2001. 
Recent research argues that the actual equity premium is much smaller than indicated 
by historical long-term averages (Siegel, 1999; Jagannathan, McGrattan and Scherbina, 
2000; Fama and French, 2002; and De Santis, 2004). In contrast, our result is that the ob- 
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served level of the long-run equity premium at 8.1% is fully consistent with the observed 
steady-state GDP growth and consistent with risk explanations as well, and thus it may 
constitute a legitimate input in capital budgeting and investment analyses. 
Nonetheless, if one believes that the 1990’s changes in dividend yields, income taxes, 
and interest rates represent permanent regime shifts, our portfolio insurance model does 
lead to a lower premium value consistent with the literature, when using parameter values 
from that period. 
2. Long-term stock market return and GDP per-capita 
growth 
Our first approach is to tackle the equity premium puzzle by using a supply-side growth 
model. Because the equity premium is typically measured by appealing to arithmetic his-
torical average returns, which are sample estimates for unconditional expected returns, it 
is reasonable to focus on unconditional expectations (Fama and French, 2002; Ibbotson 
and Chen, 2003). We appeal to the natural properties of the economy’s long-run steady-
state growth path to derive our key relationship between the equity premium and GDP 
growth. 
In the long run, Kaldor’s (1961) stylized facts show that the U.S. economy has been 
characterized by a constant nominal (and real) GDP growth rate that equals the growth 
rate of capital, with a stable factor income distribution (labor vs. capital). In a stochastic 
framework, this amounts to saying that these year-to-year growth rates are stationary sto-
chastic processes. 
We establish a link between macroeconomic and finance variables by positing that in 
the long run, the unconditional expected growth of the economy’s corporate capital stock  
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must equals the unconditional expected growth in book value of a broad stock index.
5  
The change in the index’s book value of equity is driven by clean surplus accounting. We 
also postulate that the financial environment satisfies Miller and Modigliani’s (1958) 
proposition and that the optimal capital structure is achieved for the whole economy. 
Let us develop our notations. Let  t K denote the capital stock,  t B denote the book value 
of a broad equity index,  t V  is the market value of the index, and  t e  represents total earn-
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Equation (1) states that the growth of book value for the equity index (S&P500) comes 
from two sources: the first term on the right-hand side represents internal reinvestment. 
The second term is the increment from issuing net new equity at a price equal to the cur-
rent market price adjusted for the increase in supply of shares (price divided by the factor 
s,t 1 (1+g ) + ).
6 As mentioned, our key assumption is that the expected growth of equity 
                                                 
5 It is worth noting that our approach differs from the consumption-based capital asset pricing model 
(CCAPM). In our model, agents’ optimizing behavior is in the background, and key behavioral parameters 
are considered exogenous. In addition, the typical solution of a CCAPM is a pricing kernel that involves 
agents’ conditional expectations. 
6 Using the current price adjusted ex-post is more accurate than using next period’s price because our ad-
justment precisely corrects for the price pressure due to share growth, without adding the noise of new 
market information incorporated in next period’s price. This particular adjustment works when stock de-
mand elasticities are close to one. Shleifer (1986) provides evidence of unitary stock demand elasticity for 
the S&P500.  
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book value of a broad equity index (S&P500) equals the expected growth in total capital 











where  () E ⋅  denotes the unconditional expectation operator. We assume unconditional 
expectations satisfy the following:
7 











ii)  The expected ROE equals the long-run average return on stocks μ. 
iii)  The expected long-run growth rate of population n and net new shares  s g a r e  
both constant. 
iv)  The expected growth rate of capital equals the long run average growth rate of 
GDP denoted by g. 
v)  The expected long-run payout ratio is the long run average ratio b. 












Taking unconditional expectations of both sides of equation (1), then substituting 
equation (1) into (3), by using the rest of the conditions above, then equation (3) be-
comes: 
                                                 
7 These conditions are minimal for the stock market to be in a stationary equilibrium. Condition i) comes 
from the residual accounting literature (e.g.; Ohlson, 1995) since companies that grow at the same rate as 
the economy have zero residual earnings growth and thus market value must converge to book value on 
average. Condition ii) in fact follows from condition i). Philips (1999) documents that condition ii) seems 
to hold since the average S&P500 ROE has been very close to the average stock return over the last thirty 
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Strengthening assumption iii) we posit that in the stationary equilibrium net new share 
growth  s g  equates population growth n.
8 Let  y g= g n −  denote the GDP per capita growth 
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Equation (4) is the central result of this section. It shows that the long-run nominal 
stock return is a direct function of the GDP per capita growth rate. This return also de-
pends on the retention ratio () 1b −  and the difference between two covariances: 1) the 
covariance between dividend payout and the index ROE and 2) the covariance between 
market to book ratio and the normalized growth rate of shares next period.
9 Thus, the 
long-run nominal stock return equals the long-run expected growth rate of GDP per cap-
                                                 
8 In the long run, aggregate stock wealth cannot grow faster than GDP, to rule out permanent bubbles. The 
same must be true on a per capita basis, given that the distribution of wealth is stable in the steady state. On 
one hand, the supply of net new shares has to match at least the growth of new investors. On the other 
hand, a growth of shares in excess of population growth would depress earnings-per-share and thus divi-
dends and capital gains. This would depress stock prices permanently. Corporations would then have an 
incentive to repurchase shares. Using the Federal Flow of Funds, over the period 1946–2002, the growth in 
total stock market value was 8.40%, whereas it was 7.20% for the S&P500 over the same period. Since the 
S&P500 was a relatively constant fraction of the overall market value (about 60%), and the index is on a 
per-share basis, it is evident that the difference of 1.2% represents net share growth, about equal to long-
term population growth. Loderer, Cooney, and Van Dunen (1991) show that stock prices are reduced on 
average by 1% around announcements of secondary equity offerings over a period covering 1969–1982. 
This effect is consistent again with the fact that in the long-run net new share growth happens at the rate of 
average population growth. 
9 These two expressions play a similar role as that played by the covariance between consumption growth 
and equity returns in the standard consumption-based capital asset pricing, which reflects both the riskiness 
of growth as well as the intertemporal optimal consumption choices in light of expected returns (e.g.; Han-
sen and Singleton, 1983). It is also worth noting that in these models the covariance expression treats con-
sumption growth essentially as an exogenous variable.  
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ita plus a risk premium term (the difference of covariances), divided by the percentage of 
new earnings retained. 
Because the retention ratio () 1b −  and steady-state growth rate  y g  are determined in 
the background by optimal consumption-investment decisions, equation (4) simply estab-
lishes that the long-run equity return is a function of these choices. It is important to note 
that expression (4) is the macroeconomic equivalent to the long-term sustainable growth 
formula found in standard corporate finance textbooks (for example, Brealey, Myers and 
Marcus, 1999).
10 The difference with the standard formula is that ours applies to the cor-
porate sector as a whole. 
Furthermore, the sustainable growth rate is determined by the long-run GDP per capita 
growth rate and what essentially constitutes an added systematic risk premium. When the 
first covariance  11 (, ) tt COV b R ++  is large, this means that companies pay out a greater frac-
tion of earnings when their ROE is high (procyclical), which exacerbates the volatility of 













 is large, greater stock issuance is associated with periods of high 
market-to-book ratios (procyclical). In that case, greater stock issuance will bring the 
market-to-book ratio back down, and vice versa in periods of low valuation. Thus, price 
volatility is dampened. 
Our model essentially predicts that stock markets with countercyclical aggregate divi-
dend payouts and procyclical new shares growth overall will experience a reduction in 
                                                 
10 Our result agrees with Arnott and Bernstein (2002), who find that the stock market return is directly re-
lated to per capita GDP growth.   
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the impact of market risk and therefore a lower long-term stock market return. For exam-
ple, during periods of large downside earnings volatility and low valuation, firms can re-
duce their investors’ exposure to systematic risk in two ways. One method is to smooth 
out the dividend stream by temporarily paying higher dividends. Another possibility is to 
boost earnings per share by issuing fewer shares or even by buying back existing shares. 
Any such outcome is the result of optimizing behavior, which depends on the aggregated 
preference parameters of the particular economy.
11 
The arithmetic average yearly population growth rate is n = 1.19%
12 and is assumed 
equal to the growth rate of shares  S g . Using yearly data, the arithmetic average nominal 
growth rate of GDP per capita over the 1926–2001 period is y g ≅ g n −  = 6.65% – 1.19% 
= 5.46%, and the average S&P500 dividend payout is 55.5%. Our estimate for the covari-
ance between dividend payout and ROE is –0.51%. Strikingly, this value is identical to 
the value of the sample covariance between the market to book ratio and the subsequent 
period (normalized) shares growth rate, over 1925–2001.
13 This means that over the pe-
                                                 
11 The result in expression (4) implies that, even though dividend payout policy is constant, the stock mar-
ket return will be different for two economies with widely different business cycles and growth risks. The 
second covariance term will raise the stock market return for the higher risk economy, when that covari-
ance is negative. That is, when the growth of shares is principally driven by steady financing needs of the 
corporations making up the index. In that instance, a low price-to-book environment necessitates higher 
growth of shares to meet a given financing need, although the need may be smaller during a contraction 
than during an expansion phase.  
12 This rate corresponds to the growth rate of the total U.S. population (source: Bureau of the Census) over 
the period. 
13 We construct a measure of book value for the S&P500 by using data from Robert Shiller’s Web site 
www.irrationalexuberance.com. We assume that the book value of the index in 1871 was equal to its mar-
ket value. Year-to-year, we add retained earnings to the previous year’s book value. Our computation of the 
ROE is then done from year-end 1926 until 2001. The market-book ratio for the S&P500 is assumed simi-
lar to that of the aggregate corporate sector. The data is from the Federal Flow of Funds over the period 
1952–2001. The missing market-to-book values for 1926-1951 are reconstructed by back-trending corpo-
rate market and book values, using regressions of the log of these variables on linear time trends over 1952-
2001. Again, because the S&P500 was a relatively constant fraction of the overall market value (about 
60%), an index for the number of stock shares in the S&P500 is constructed by dividing the market value 
of corporate equity by the value of S&P500 index.  
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riod, both dividend payouts and net new share issuance have been countercyclical in the 









This final value is nearly identical to the arithmetic average nominal stock return value 
of 12.2% estimated for example by Siegel (2002) for the period 1926–2001. Hence, we 
have derived an exact analytical relationship linking the average real stock return and 
long-term GDP per capita growth. Examining equation (5), we observe that the smaller 
the retention ratio is, the greater the stock return is for a given GDP per capita growth 
rate.
14  
3. The return on corporate assets and return on debt 
Whereas the first piece of the equity premium puzzle was the return on the stock market, 
the second piece is the return on debt. In this section, we focus on deriving the average 
return on corporate debt for the economy. As an intermediate step, we examine the econ-
omy’s required return on corporate assets (RRCA) from the investors’ standpoint. The 
required return on corporate assets is the discount rate that makes the present value of 
                                                 
14 If all earnings are reinvested (b = 0), so that no dividends or share repurchases occur and growth is fi-
nanced internally, the best return that investors could expect to earn is GDP per capita growth. This sug-
gests that leverage may enhance stock returns by allowing firms to maintain asset and earnings growth and 
still boost stock returns through dividends and repurchases.  
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expected future after-tax cash flows accruing to creditors and equity holders equal to the 
market value of the corporate asset base in the economy.
15 
Again, we predict that in the long run, the expected growth of the capital stock at the 
economy level equals the growth in book value for the S&P500. Furthermore, the corpo-
rate debt-equity ratio also must be constant in the steady state given an environment a la 
Miller and Modigliani (1958). Future cash flows are given by after personal income tax 
t T , expected corporate dividends  t D , and net interest payments  t IP  on outstanding cor-
porate debt.
16  Assuming market efficiency, the market value of all corporate assets must 
equal the present value of all expected future cash flows net of taxes that accrue to credi-
tors and shareholders at the economy level. Formally, this is expressed as:  




(1 T ) D IP








Π+ ∑  (5) 
where  () E ⋅  again stands for the unconditional expectation operator. We assume that 
in every period j, the corresponding discount rate RRCAj is constant and equal to the 
long-term average RRCA given by: 
 RRCA  =  D (1 L) r L μ× −+×  (6) 
The long-term nominal stock return is again denoted by μ . The variable  D r  stands for 
the nominal return on corporate debt/bonds, and L stands for the fraction of the investor’s 
portfolio invested in debt or alternatively corporate leverage. We hypothesize that in the 
                                                 
15 Fama and French (1999) compute an IRR based on operating and investment cash flows. Our approach is 
grounded in the steady-state analysis of the economy. In that context, the fraction of dividend plus net in-
terest payments over the market value of corporate assets should be constant, whereas its components may 
not be constant. In fact, this fraction of total payments has been relatively constant over the period exam-
ined, whereas the relative size of interest payments compared with dividends has increased. 
16 Cash flows are in nominal terms. This current model does not incorporate capital gains taxes because 
dividend cash flows and interest are assumed paid forever. The tax rate, Tt, is an average marginal tax rate 
that blends dividend income and interest income tax rates.  
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long run, the sum of expected dividends plus interest payments to investors is a constant 
fraction λ of GDP, as they cannot together grow faster than GDP. Again, let g  stand for 
the nominal long-term average GDP growth rate. Given an average marginal tax rate of 
T, the above-mentioned expression (5) becomes: 
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Equation (7) is the steady-state version of equation (5). The result in equation (7) in-
deed is the standard growing perpetuity formula applied to the entire asset base of the 
corporate sector. Thus, the RRCA is also given by: 
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=  (9) 
We use Flow of Funds data and National Income and Product Accounts data from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, for the nonfinancial corporate sector over the period 
1954–2001. The variables used are net interest payments, dividend payments, total debt, 
market value of equity and book value of equity. Average marginal tax rates on dividend 
and interest income are obtained from Estrella and Fuhrer for the period 1954–1979 and 
from the National Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM model for the period 1980– 
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1999.
17 Because our marginal income tax data is limited to 1954–1999, we extrapolate 
the 1999 taxes rates for the years 2000 and 2001. 
To determine leverage, we use book value of equity. This approach is supported by the 
evidence of stability of book leverage over the period 1951–1996 documented by Fama 
and French (1999). The average value for the book leverage ratio over our period is 
38.05%; the average value for the ratio of the net total payments to investors over total 
market value of assets (before taxes) λ
0
0
Assets   Corp   MV
GDP
 equals 3.67%. The average 
blended marginal (dividend plus interest) income tax rate is 35%. Table 1 below summa-
rizes the main parameters for the model. 
 
Table 1: Estimated parameter values for return on corporate assets and debt formulas 





  μ  
6.65% 5.46% 55.5% 35% 38.05% 3.27%  112%  12.27% 
 
From these parameters and equation (9), we obtain a value for the real RRCA of 
5.89%, based on a long-term GDP nominal growth rate of 6.65% and inflation rate of 
3.14%. This result is nearly identical to Fama and French’s (1999) estimate of 5.95% 
over the period 1950–1996. Finally, using formula (10) our estimate for the nominal re-
                                                 
17 Even though there is a difference in methods between the two approaches, we do not believe that these 
differences affect our conclusions in any significant way.  
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turn on debt is 3.74%, which is close to the real T-bill arithmetic historical average of 
3.93% for 1926–2001.
18 
This result is surprising. It suggests that the overall corporate debt may be considered 
risk-free in the long run! However, we must recognize that the Flow of Funds corporate 
debt data has a survivor bias. The corporate debt data do not retroactively correct for de-
faulted debt, and thus the Flow of Funds reports interest payments that typically begin to 
shrink earlier than the reported principal does, which biases computed rates downward.
19  
4.  Growth and the long-run equity premium 
Finally, we derive the difference between the return on corporate equity versus corporate 
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 (10) 
The difference depends positively on the rate of growth of GDP, on the blended mar-
ginal income tax rate T and on systematic risk, and negatively on leverage and the net 
growth of shares. The fact that the difference between stocks and corporate bonds seems 
                                                 
18Fama and French (1999) discuss the use of simple versus compounded returns as discount rates. They 
argue that under certain conditions the expected one period simple return is the appropriate discount rate. 
Otherwise, a more appropriate method is to use a weighted average of simple and compound returns. 
19This leads to an understatement of the actual long-term return on debt that should probably include a de-
fault premium. Thus, the growth of actual issued volume of debt should exceed GDP growth by an amount 
equal to the average corporate default rate. Note also that any inflation risk and interest rate risk are already 
embedded in the T-Bill rate. Furthermore, because we are examining arithmetic average returns, capturing 
1-year investment horizons, the inflation and interest rate risks may bear a smaller effect than for debt 
yields representing multiyear horizons. It turns out that using market-value based average historical lever-
age instead of book-value leverage ratio lowers our estimate of the return on debt even more because the 
value of the leverage ratio is 34.23% over 1954–2001.  
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related to GDP growth is sensible if we note that a bond is a claim to a fixed income 
stream, whereas a stock is a claim to both growing dividends and earnings streams. 
In section 3, we show that the return on corporate debt  D r  nearly equals the risk-free 
rate in the long run. This result implies that formula (10) characterizes the equity pre-
mium as well.
20 Over the period of 1926–2001, and after combining our prior estimates 
for the long-term return on debt and the return on stocks, we obtain a value for the pre-
mium of equity over the 3-month T-Bill equal to 8.3%, which closely matches the his-
torical estimate of 8.1% over the examined period. 
5.  Portfolio insurance and the equity premium 
The literature on the equity premium has so far shown scanty evidence of the link be-
tween the premium and risk. Asness (2000) attempts to empirically reconcile the pre-
mium with measures of the difference in risk between bonds and stocks and achieves 
some relative success for rolling market periods of 20 years, but falls short of explaining 
the premium over the full historical record. 
In this section, we show that option pricing can help us derive a measure for the equity 
premium that is directly related to observed historical stock return volatility. In fact, we 
show that the long-run equity premium is closely related to an investor’s objective of 
averting downside risk. 
Consider an investor adopting the following long-term strategy: every year, invest $1 
in a stock index and buy a put option on the index (with a real $1 strike), sell the stock at 
the end of the year. This is an instance of seeking portfolio insurance by using a protec-
                                                 
20 Again, if it weren’t for the survivor bias in the Flow of Funds corporate debt data, we should expect that 
corporate debt returns would incorporate a default premium.  
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tive put (Merton, Scholes, and Gladstein, 1982). The yearly maximum loss is limited to 
the loss of the put premium. In the long run, the expected stock return must be the arith-
metic average of the index return. We postulate that yearly market volatility is expected 
to equal the annual volatility given by a long-term horizon estimate. In that case, the put 
option price remains constant. We also posit that the index pays a known dividend. 
Formally, let μ   be the arithmetic average real stock return, let r  be the arithmetic av-
erage real risk-free rate, q is the real after-tax dividend yield, and c and p are the respec-
tive option prices for the European call and put. Our goal is to find the value of this put 
option. Assume that the current index price is $1 and the strike price is $1 (real), and us-
ing compounded rates of returns, the put-call parity formula for a dividend paying stock 
(Hull, 2003) leads to express the put price as: 
 
rq p ce e
− − =+ −
  (11) 
Following Rubinstein (1984), we define the real risk-neutral expected future value of 




μ− Ε= Ε + −
  (12) 
Given that the expected capital gains rate is greater than zero, the expected value for 





  (13) 
                                                 
21 We are applying Rubinstein’s (1984) approach to real (deflated) values of expected call and put prices. 
Rubinstein also defines these expectations for a horizon h as a fraction of one year and for volatility esti-
mates that may differ for individuals compared with the overall market. Here we posit that h is arbitrarily 
close to one and that individual estimates are arbitrarily close to the market volatility.  
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Thus, the real expected future value of the call option equals the real expected capital 
gains rate.
22 We postulate that the present value of the expected future call value dis-





  (14) 





  (15) 
Hence, the equity premium can be expressed as: 
 Ln(1 )
q re p μ −≅ +   (16) 
Thus, the risk premium approximately equals the value of a European put option on a 
stock index compounded at the dividend yield rate (using the average annual standard 
deviation of prices). Applying Black and Scholes’ (1973) approach, we can evaluate the 
price of such a put option. It is well known that the resulting value is independent of the 
expected stock return and investor preferences.
24 Assume that the strike price and the cur-
rent stock price are both equal to $1 and that the option’s maturity is 1 year. The standard 
formula for an option on a dividend paying stock index (with taxes) is given by Scholes 
(1976).
25 According to our strategy, an investor sells her stock at the end of each year. 
                                                 
22 It is interesting to note that this same result can be derived using Black and Scholes’ (1973) call option 
approach to corporate equity. In that case, we would have to assume that stocks are initially purchased us-
ing zero-coupon debt and that the minimum real required return on debt is zero. 
23 Using parameter values introduced later, we find that the Black–Scholes current call price equals 6.56%, 
whereas our estimate is 6.50%. 
24 This approach is subject to the standard criticism of the normality assumption of the stock market return 
distribution (e.g., Fama 1965). 
25 Scholes (1976) prices a European call option. A put option can be priced using the put-call parity for-
mula.  
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We posit that he or she is taxed at the marginal ordinary income tax rate and that this tax 
rate equals the dividend income marginal tax rate T. Hence, the formula is: 







(1 ) dividend yield
















Thus, using the relationship between the put option and the equity premium expressed 
in (16) and the put pricing formula (17), we obtain an independent estimate of the pre-
mium. We apply formula (17) with the following parameters: the dividend tax rate corre-
sponds to the average marginal rate over 1954–1999 (with 1999 values used for the years 
2000 and 2001). The value for the tax rate is 40%.
26 The standard deviation of stock in-
dex returns is a historical estimate using continuously compounded annual real total 
S&P500 returns over 1926–2001. We adjust total returns according to Hull (2003), by 
removing the effect of dividends on stock volatility to account for the risky portion of 
stock prices. The value of the standard deviation σ is estimated at 18.87%. 
Our estimate of the inflation-adjusted pretax average S&P500 dividend yield is 4.20% 
over the same period. The value for the real risk-free rate corresponds to the T-Bill arith-
metic average real rate of 0.76% over that period as well. We then arrive at a value for 
the put option premium p of 8.29%, and a value for the risk premium of 8.16%, which is 
nearly identical to our prior estimate for the risk premium. 
Note that the insurance strategy presented above does not fully guarantee a risk-free 
return on a yearly basis. To achieve that goal, the investor could for example sell a call 
                                                 
26 The estimates for 1954–1979 are from Estrella and Fuhrer (1983) and for 1980–1999 from the NBER 
TAXSIM model.  
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option in addition to owning a protective put. However, over a long-term investment ho-
rizon, stocks are on average as “riskless” as bonds, in the sense that they deliver an aver-
age return that is more and more certain with longer horizons, based on real long-term 
GDP per capita growth. The difference between riskless securities and stocks is that risk-
less securities are a perfect hedge against short-term market downside risk, whereas 
stocks obviously are not. Our result shows that the long-run equity premium reflects a 
portfolio insurance motive since there would otherwise be an opportunity for a riskless 
long-term arbitrage, in the sense that put-call parity would be violated on average. 
Our result demonstrates that the risk-free rate and the long-term stock return are 
jointly defined in relation to the premium on a put option. Our analysis of the return to 
corporate assets above, when combined with the result of this section, leads us to offer a 
new view of the debt versus stock trade-off, in which bondholders and stockholders mu-
tually benefit from co-financing corporate assets at the macroeconomic level. Stockhold-
ers will benefit from leveraging assets since they can boost equity returns via receiving 
higher dividends all the while maintaining constant asset and earnings growth rates. 
In this new view, it is useful to consider that an investor following our portfolio insur-
ance strategy is a debt holder. Debt holders by choosing to hold debt instead of equity 
settle to earn a lower long-term return (than equity holders), because they choose to fully 
insure against the loss of their principal in the short run. Thus, in equilibrium, agents will 
be indifferent between holding debt or equity, because insuring one’s principal is costly. 
Debt holders are in effect “paying” a portfolio insurance premium to stockholders, and 
thus end-up with a return equal to the risk-free rate on average.  
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This argument has an interesting implication regarding the traditional view of com-
pensation for risk. The standard CAPM uses a “bottom-up” approach to the equity pre-
mium: the equity premium is added to the risk-free rate to compensate stockholders for 
the extra risk borne by them. Our logic of portfolio insurance presents a top-down view 
of the premium: the premium is subtracted from the long-term equity return to obtain the 
risk-free rate, because insurance is a cost.
27 This logic obviously does not violate the 
spirit of CAPM. 
6.  A shrinking equity premium? 
Jagannathan, McGrattan and Scherbina (2000) and Fama and French (2002) argue that 
ex-post returns are a distorted view of expected returns and that a lower equity premium 









                                                 
27 In the limit case of 100% debt-financing, corporate debt holders would require the same return as “eq-
uity” holders (or T-Bill return plus risk premium). However, to avoid short-term principal losses, debt-
holders would have to use our portfolio insurance strategy and sacrifice the premium. The recent rising 
corporate trend of using leverage to pay dividends may cause an increase in the equity premium, since the 
premium is an increasing function of the dividend yield, for a given level of the risk-free rate and inde-
pendently of leverage risk. 
Beg. Year Div. Yield Div. Tax Rate SD Mkt. Return Real T-Bill Est. Premium
Period 1970 3.62% 36.48% 12.61% 1.38% 5.38%
Ending 1982 3.21% 29.08% 11.68% 3.26% 4.08%
December 1990 2.46% 27.84% 10.51% 2.25% 3.87%
1999 1995 1.78% 29.06% 10.90% 2.89% 3.49%
Period 1970 3.32% 35.23% 12.69% 1.17% 5.44%
Ending 1982 2.83% 29.11% 12.31% 2.63% 4.49%
December 1990 2.15% 28.13% 12.03% 1.62% 4.65%
2004 1995 1.68% 29.18% 13.25% 1.67% 4.91%
Table 2: Estimates of the equity premium using the portfolio insurance model. 1970–2004. 
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Table 2 shows that for various time horizons, our portfolio insurance model predicts 
an overall decline in the equity premium before the market crash of 2000 with a mini-
mum premium value around 3.5%, and an increase back to about 5% for periods ending 
in 2004.
28 These estimates are in line with the above-cited literature. The observed de-
cline in the premium compared to the 1926–2001 average of 8.1%, seems to originate 
from declining trends in dividend yields, marginal dividend income tax rates and stock 
market volatility along with a rise in the average real T-Bill returns since the 1980s. 
Because our model works as a predictor of long-term premia, the results shown in Ta-
ble 2 are only applicable if we assume that these recent trends in dividend yields, mar-
ginal tax rates and interest rates represent permanent regime shifts. This latter view may 
coincide with the Federal Reserve (Fed) recent monetary policy trend, since the Fed ap-
pears committed to keep inflation rates and discount rates low (although the slide of T-
bill rates in the 1 to 2% range is also responsible for larger premia in periods ending in 
2004). Regarding tax policy, marginal dividend and capital gains tax rates have reached 
their lowest levels in history, and hiking rates back up is a virtual political impossibility. 
On the other hand, dividend policy seems to have shifted towards lower payouts over the 
1990s (Fama and French, 2001). However, investors can easily decide to reverse the 
trend if they perceive that capital gains are exposed to greater downside risk.
29 
                                                 
28 Parameter values are annualized monthly averages, except for dividend taxes (yearly averages) and ex-
cept for the periods starting in 1970, where the real T-Bill is averaged yearly. S&P500 standard deviations 
are annualized and based on monthly continuously compounded real returns. 
29 Another potential issue is that share repurchases may counter the effect of lower dividend yields. Grullon 
and Michaely (2002) report that since the mid-1980s, large established U.S. firms did not increase divi-
dends as much as they could have, but rather chose to buy back shares. Thus, in all likelihood, lower ex-
pected dividend yields have been associated with greater expected capital gains. In that instance, our port-
folio insurance model makes the provision in equation (13) that the expected future value of the S&P500 
call option fully reflects these capital gains expectations and thus that the equity premium embodies these 
trend expectations as well.  
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One reason why our premium estimates seem to rise slightly (controlling for the slide 
in T-bill rates) for horizons ending in 2004 compared with 2000 is that market volatility 
did rise after the market crash of 2000. This effect is accentuated for short horizon peri-
ods (15 years or less). To smooth out the effect of the 2000 market crash, an intermediate 
range of about 20 years may be more appropriate. Table 2 then shows that for horizons 
starting in 1982 the premium can be estimated in the 4 to 4.5% range. 
7. Conclusion 
We show that the long-run equity premium is theoretically and empirically consistent 
with GDP growth and a portfolio insurance motive. We derive the long-run ex-ante eq-
uity return and long-run corporate debt and asset returns using a supply-side growth 
model. We arrive at a macroeconomic generalization of the standard sustainable growth 
formula used in corporate finance textbooks to determine the long-run average return on 
stocks. 
The long-term average stock return depends on GDP per capita growth, the earnings 
retention rate, and a premium linked to de-trended earnings volatility and market-to-book 
volatility and the response of dividend and share repurchase policies to these factors. Our 
model accurately replicates the arithmetic average historical returns for the S&P500. Our 
first conclusion is that the equity premium defined as the difference between the S&P500 
stock return and 3-month T-Bill is consistent with observed GDP growth and other finan-
cial parameters such as marginal income tax rates. 
Our result also hinges on the fact that the Flow of Funds data on corporate debt and 
S&P data on the equity side have an inherent survivor bias. Interestingly, our analysis 
entails that the corporate debt of surviving firms exhibits a long-term average return that  
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is essentially risk-free. In actuality, because investors typically invest in bond portfolios 
that experience failure rates, a default premium should be added to our estimate. 
Our second key result is that the equity premium is consistent with a short-term port-
folio insurance motive. We show that the equity premium is closely approximated by a 
put option premium on a real $1 investment in the market index when a long-term inves-
tor wishes to insure against year-to-year market volatility, by using the average yearly 
S&P500 volatility over 1926–2001. This result leads us to a new view of corporate asset 
financing where investors, pursuing a short-term insurance motive, are indifferent be-
tween long-run equity returns and the comparatively lower rate on short-term Treasury 
bonds. Debt holders looking to insure their principal essentially forego long-run equity 
returns by “paying” an insurance premium equal to the equity premium. 
Siegel (1999), Jagannathan, McGrattan and Scherbina (2000), Fama and French 
(2002), and De Santis (2004) all claim that ex-post returns are a distorted view of ex-
pected returns and that a lower equity premium is justified compared with the historical 
average. Our results suggest that using an 8.1% premium in valuation formulas and capi-
tal budgeting problems may be appropriate, since the observed level of the long-run eq-
uity premium is fully consistent with the observed steady-state GDP growth and consis-
tent with risk explanations as well. However, if one believes that the recent 1990’s trends 
in dividend yields, interest rates, taxes and inflation represent permanent regime shifts, 
our model can be parameterized to yield a 3.5% equity premium in line, for example, 
with Fama and French’s (2002) estimate.  
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Future research will examine the determinants of the equity premium’s countercyclical 
behavior in the short to medium-term. In that respect, using European options on the 
S&P500 seems to be a promising avenue to characterize the equity premium.  
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